Dodgers' Dominance: How a Model Franchise Perfects the Game (2026)

Before you point fingers at the Dodgers for dominating the game, consider this: they’re simply mastering a system that’s inherently flawed. But here’s where it gets controversial—should we blame them for being brilliant, or the system for allowing it? The Los Angeles Dodgers are a powerhouse, a franchise built on a foundation of shrewd decisions and strategic investments. They’re not just playing the game; they’re rewriting the rules of success. As the old saying goes, ‘Don’t hate the player, hate the game.’

The Dodgers’ ambition is crystal clear: they want to win championships, and there’s nothing inherently wrong with that. Take Kyle Tucker, for instance. He’s a solid player, but with a $57 million average annual salary (adjusted for deferrals), he’s undeniably overpaid. And this is the part most people miss—the Dodgers can afford him, and he makes them better. If they’re willing to pay, who are we to judge?

However, it’s naive to think any team can replicate the Dodgers’ model. When the Dodgers set their sights on a player, they outbid everyone else. What’s a team like the New York Mets to do? They settle for the next best option, like Bo Bichette, and offer him a staggering three years and $126 million. This is free agency at work—Tucker’s contract sets a precedent for Bichette, and Bichette’s will do the same for the next player. It’s the free market in action, and it’s undeniably elevated baseball.

Fifty years ago, when free agency began, owners were up in arms. Yet, the benefits soon spread across the league—from the New York Yankees to the Philadelphia Phillies, Houston Astros, and San Diego Padres. These teams achieved success they’d never seen before. Fans have embraced free agency, but baseball remains the only major sport without a salary cap. When the Dodgers flex their financial muscle, calls for a cap grow louder.

The last collective bargaining agreement introduced measures to curb tanking and service-time manipulation, and luxury taxes are here to stay. Yet, the reality remains: some owners are wealthier and more aggressive than others. The league needs a system that encourages low-payroll teams to spend more—give them the funds, but mandate they invest in players. Sounds ideal, right? But here’s the catch—if owners raise the floor, they’ll want to lower the ceiling, effectively creating a salary cap. And let’s be honest, that’s a non-starter.

In 1994, players drew a line in the sand against a salary cap, striking to prevent owners from imposing one. The result? A canceled World Series and a delayed season. The lesson? A salary cap is a nuclear option—too dangerous to deploy. You can’t win a war by destroying the game.

With the current CBA expiring this December, both sides must find a solution that protects the 2027 season without a salary cap, while addressing the perception of unfairness in the sport. And this is where it gets tricky—this perception is deeply ingrained. Remember Michael Lewis’ Moneyball? Its subtitle, ‘The Art of Winning an Unfair Game,’ sums it up—and that was over two decades ago.

Payroll disparities aren’t new. In 1992, the Mets had the highest payroll at $44.3 million, while the Cleveland Indians had the lowest at $8.2 million—just 18.5% of the Mets’ total. Fast forward to last year, the Dodgers’ opening day payroll was $325.9 million, compared to the Miami Marlins’ $69.1 million—a mere 21.2% of the Dodgers’ figure. Yet, baseball has survived these inequalities because the game itself is the great equalizer. Before their recent World Series wins, the Dodgers suffered back-to-back division series losses to San Diego and Arizona. Short series are unpredictable, and it’s easy to forget that.

The Dodgers have adapted by prioritizing roster depth over regular-season dominance, ensuring they’re playoff-bound. This strategy allows them to rest their star pitchers, relying on openers and placeholders instead. If it means playing a wild-card round, so be it. Last fall, Tyler Glasnow, Blake Snell, and Shohei Ohtani were ready when it mattered, starting 70.5% of the Dodgers’ postseason games after just 26.5% in the regular season.

It’s not exactly sportsmanlike, but it’s undeniably smart. Andrew Friedman’s front office has mastered innovation and adaptation. Remember their matchup-heavy approach in the 2018 World Series against the Red Sox? Last year, eight position players started all seven games against the Blue Jays. The Dodgers build their lineup through strategic acquisitions, capitalizing on opportunities others miss.

Freddie Freeman wanted to stay in Atlanta, but the Braves let him walk. The Red Sox undervalued Mookie Betts, trading him to the Dodgers for minimal return. The Angels paired Shohei Ohtani with Mike Trout for six years and still couldn’t finish above .500. Will Smith, the hero of Game 7 in Toronto, was a 32nd-round draft pick in 2016, now signed for a reasonable $14 million per season through 2033. The Dodgers saw potential in Max Muncy when others didn’t, and they acquired Tommy Edman in a lopsided trade. Manager Dave Roberts expertly utilizes veterans like Kiké Hernández and Miguel Rojas.

Yes, the Dodgers are wealthy and play in a desirable city, but the other L.A. team is struggling. Chicago’s teams have three pennants since 1946, New York’s teams have one championship in 25 years, and Missouri’s teams have three in that span. Baseball has crowned 16 different champions since 2000, compared to 14 in the NHL, 13 in the NFL, and 12 in the NBA. Since 2012, 18 MLB teams have played in the World Series, versus 17 in the Stanley Cup Finals, 13 in the Super Bowl, and 13 in the NBA Finals.

The Dodgers take risks others avoid—signing Tucker for $60 million annually, or players like Michael Conforto, Tanner Scott, and Kirby Yates, who underperformed last season despite earning $46 million combined. Older, pricier players come with their own challenges, just like younger, cheaper ones. Money helps, but it’s not everything. Teams like Milwaukee, Cleveland, and Tampa Bay make smart decisions but fall short in October. Randomness hasn’t favored them.

Players and owners should find creative ways to level the playing field, but you can’t make the Dodgers less ambitious or intelligent. As long as they remain smart, driven, and opportunistic, this era will be theirs. So, here’s the question—is the Dodgers’ dominance a problem with the team, or the system? Let’s hear your thoughts in the comments.

Dodgers' Dominance: How a Model Franchise Perfects the Game (2026)

References

Top Articles
Latest Posts
Recommended Articles
Article information

Author: Dong Thiel

Last Updated:

Views: 6769

Rating: 4.9 / 5 (79 voted)

Reviews: 94% of readers found this page helpful

Author information

Name: Dong Thiel

Birthday: 2001-07-14

Address: 2865 Kasha Unions, West Corrinne, AK 05708-1071

Phone: +3512198379449

Job: Design Planner

Hobby: Graffiti, Foreign language learning, Gambling, Metalworking, Rowing, Sculling, Sewing

Introduction: My name is Dong Thiel, I am a brainy, happy, tasty, lively, splendid, talented, cooperative person who loves writing and wants to share my knowledge and understanding with you.